In this article, we propose a novel paper fingerprinting technique based on analyzing the translucent patterns revealed when a light source shines through the paper. These patterns represent the inherent texture of paper, formed by the random interleaving of wooden particles during the manufacturing process. We show that these patterns can be easily captured by a commodity camera and condensed into a compact 2,048-bit fingerprint code. Prominent works in this area (Nature 2005, IEEE S&P 2009, CCS 2011 have all focused on fingerprinting paper based on the paper "surface." We are motivated by the observation that capturing the surface alone misses important distinctive features such as the noneven thickness, random distribution of impurities, and different materials in the paper with varying opacities. Through experiments, we demonstrate that the embedded paper texture provides a more reliable source for fingerprinting than features on the surface. Based on the collected datasets, we achieve 0% false rejection and 0% false acceptance rates. We further report that our extracted fingerprints contain 807 degrees of freedom (DoF), which is much higher than the 249 DoF with iris codes (that have the same size of 2,048 bits). The high amount of DoF for texturebased fingerprints makes our method extremely scalable for recognition among very large databases; it also allows secure usage of the extracted fingerprint in privacy-preserving authentication schemes based on error correction techniques.
INTRODUCTION
Secure paper documents. Designing secure documents that provide high levels of security against physical forgery is a long-standing problem. Even in today's digital age, this problem remains important as physical paper is still prevalently used in our daily lives as a means to prove data authenticity (e.g., in receipts, contracts, certificates, and passports). A recent trend in this area 9:2 E. Toreini et al.
(e.g., in e-passports) is to embed electronics such as RFID chips within the physical document in question (Juels et al. 2005) . However, the security of such solutions depends on the tamper resistance of the chip, which must securely store a long-term secret (Chothia and Smirnov 2010) . This tamper-resistance requirement can significantly increase the cost of production. In view of the importance of ensuring the authenticity of paper documents, researchers have been exploring the application of digital technologies to prevent counterfeiting. One promising method is based on measuring the unique physical properties of paper that are impossible to clone.
Paper fingerprinting. Manufacturing a paper sheet is a complex process, and each paper sheet is a unique product from that process. Typically, wooden particles are used as the base, and multiple substances are subsequently applied to stick these particles together to stabilize their placement and shape a thin, usually white, steady surface that we call paper. Buchanan et al. (2005) observed that the surface of a paper sheet is imperfect-it contains random nonevenness as a natural outcome of the paper manufacturing process. They propose to utilize the surface imperfections to uniquely identify the paper. Their method is to use a focused laser beam to scan a predesignated region on the paper sheet from four different angles and continuously record the intensity of the reflected laser. The recordings then constitute a unique digital representation of the paper, called the paper fingerprint. Therefore, the method of Buchanan et al. (2005) is the basis of several follow-up works, notably those of van Beijnum et al. (2006) and Samsul et al. (2010) . Clarkson et al. (2009) subsequently showed that a commodity scanner could be used to effectively extract paper fingerprints based on the same surface imperfections. Their method is to scan the paper surface from four different angles and then construct a 3D model. Then the 3D model is condensed into a concise feature vector, which forms the paper fingerprint.
Later, Sharma et al. (2011) proposed another approach named PaperSpeckle, which uses a microscope with a built-in LED as the light source to extract the paper speckle patterns at the microscopic level (1 to 2 μm). The underlying idea in PaperSpeckle is based on the concept of speckles-that is, when light falls on a paper sheet, the scattered light forms randomly mixed bright and dark regions, which can then be captured by a microscope. The captured image can be further processed to produce a compact binary fingerprint.
Our idea. Thus far, prominent works in this area have primarily focused on the imperfections of the paper surface. In contrast, our work is inspired by the observation that the wooden particles constituting the building blocks of a paper sheet scatter over the paper quite irregularly. We hypothesize that this irregular placement of wooden particles provides a unique pattern, which can be extracted and used as a paper fingerprint. We call the unique pattern caused by the random interleaving of wooden particles the texture of paper.
Unlike previous works that measure the paper surface characteristics, we propose to fingerprint a paper sheet based on measuring the paper texture patterns. We capture the texture by putting a light source on one side of the paper and using a commodity camera to take a photograph on the other side. This is intuitively based on the common observation that putting a paper sheet under light will immediately reveal rich irregular textural patterns visible even to the naked eye. Figure 1 shows the difference between photos taken of the paper surface (based on reflective light) and of the paper texture (based on transmissive light).
Contributions. The main contributions of this article are as follows:
-We revisit paper fingerprinting and propose to use the textural patterns revealed by passing light through a paper sheet as a reliable source for extracting a fingerprint, as opposed to previous measures that are based on paper surface imperfections. -We design an efficient paper fingerprinting algorithm based on error correction and image processing techniques, and carry out experiments to show that our method can be used to efficiently extract a reliable and unique fingerprint using a photo taken by an off-the-shelf camera. Our proposed method is feasible and inexpensive to deploy in practice. -We conduct further experiments to demonstrate that our method is robust against (a) nonideal photo capturing settings, such as when the paper is rotated and the light source is changed, and (b) nonideal paper handling situations, such as crumpling, soaking, heating, and scribbling on the surface.
PAPER TEXTURE
When light falls on an object, it is partly absorbed, partly reflected, and partly transmitted, and paper is no exception. Absorption occurs based on the resonance principle: the energy of the light waves of a specific frequency is absorbed and transformed into kinetic energy by electrons of the same frequency. The part that is not absorbed is either reflected or transmitted depending on how opaque (or conversely transparent) the paper is. Different types of paper behave differently in terms of how much light they absorb, reflect, or transmit. This behavior depends, among other factors, on pulp material, density, thickness, and coating substances. Opacity, as defined by the ISO 2471 standard (ISO 2008) , can be seen as an indicator of how much light is impeded from transmitting through the paper, with the opacity of 100% defined for fully opaque papers. Typical office printing paper, with grammage between 75 and 105 g/m 2 , has opacity between 86% and 94%. To put this in perspective, opacity for newsprint paper (typical grammage: 40 to 49 g/m 2 ) is in the range of 90% to 94% and for tracing paper (typical grammage: 60 to 110 g/m 2 ) is in the range of 24% to 40% (Goyal 2015) . These values suggest that a considerable proportion of light transmits through such paper, which forms the basis of our proposal to fingerprint paper based on its textural patterns.
Intuitively, the textural patterns created and stabilized throughout the paper in the process of manufacturing can provide a promising source for paper fingerprinting. These patterns are naturally occurring and appear random. Moreover, they are embedded within the bonded structure of the paper and hence are relatively well protected against manual handling of paper. They are generated as a result of the wooden particles randomly interleaved during the manufacturing process. Finally, once in the finished product, the randomly interleaved wooden particles cannot be altered without damaging the paper, hence making any tampering act evident.
To capture the embedded textural patterns of paper and subsequently extract a fingerprint, we limit ourselves to a single photo taken by a commodity camera. This makes our solution more practical and quicker than the previous proposal (Clarkson et al. 2009 ) that has to take multiple scans (on a paper surface) from four different angles to compute a fingerprint. We note that a single photo is feasible in our case because the paper texture contains richer features than the paper surface, such as the thickness of the overlaying wooden particles, randomly distributed 9:4 E. Toreini et al. Step-by-step rotation recognition process in the preparation phase. The last step produces a mask that distinguishes the pixels containing reliable information suitable for feature extraction (black region) from the pixels containing unreliable information (white region).
impurities, and different embedded materials with varying opacities. In the rest of the article, we conduct experiments to show that we can reliably extract a paper fingerprint from the textural patterns.
Applications. A vast number of official and legal documents, certificates, official receipts, and invoices are printed on regular office paper (sometimes with watermarks, holograms, or other security measures), thermal paper, or other types of paper. A property that the majority of these types of paper have in common is that they are not completely opaque. This means that a considerable amount of light passes through them. Furthermore, embedded irregular textural patterns as a natural result of the manufacturing process seem to be a universal property of all of these different types of paper. Consequently, there is considerable potential for exploiting paper fingerprints extracted from embedded textural patterns to validate the authenticity of such official and legal documents.
TEXTURE ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss a high-level description of our proposed method for capturing paper textural patterns and extracting a reliable and unique paper fingerprint from those patterns. To be able to capture paper textural patterns, we take a digital photograph of the paper sheet through which light is projected. Then we need to perform a series of preparation operations, such as aligning and resizing of the original image. Afterward, in the texture analysis phase, we utilize a 2D Gabor filter (Daugman 1985) to extract textural information from the captured image. Subsequently, we propose a simple paper fingerprint extraction method that generates a binary string, the paper fingerprint. Once paper fingerprints are in the binary string format, they can be compared using well-known methods, such as computing the fractional Hamming distance between any two paper fingerprints. In the following, we give more details about the preparation phase, Gabor transform, the fingerprint generation method, and the fingerprint comparison method based on fractional Hamming distance. Further implementation details and settings of our experiments will be discussed in Section 4.
Preparation Phase
The preparation phase consists of operations of identifying the designated area of the photo to be used for fingerprint extraction and aligning the image in terms of movement and rotation. To indicate the fingerprinting area, we print a small rectangular box on the paper sheet. In addition, we print a filled square on the bottom left of the box to allow automatic alignment by our implementation.
As shown in Figure 2 , aligning the rotation of the image involves several steps. We start with a photo of the fingerprinting area. The photo is converted into greyscale. The printed region (the rectangular box and the filled square) can be easily identified by applying a greyscale threshold. This threshold is computed by the Otsu method (Otsu 1975) , which chooses the threshold in a such way to minimize the interclass variance of black and white pixels. We have applied the same approach for both reflection and transmission analyses. We observe that the borders in both reflection and transmission samples were recognized correctly using this technique. The result is a binary image: "0" for black and "1" for white. This simple thresholding may also produce some "noise" scattered around the image, which can be easily removed based on area. To ensure that the borders of the printed rectangle are connected, we draw a convex hull of the outer pixels to form a connected shape. This process also identifies artifacts, such as those caused by pen scribbling, which we will test in the robustness experiments. The pixel positions of identified artifacts are defined in a mask function, which we explain in the following.
Once the printed rectangle is identified, we fill up the region within the rectangular border with the binary value 1 (white). We identify the center of mass of the rectangular object based on computing the first-order moment (Teague 1980) and use that as the new origin of the Cartesian coordinate system. This corrects any misalignment due to paper movement.
Then we need to correct any misalignment caused by rotation. This is based on computing second-order moments (Teague 1980) in the new Cartesian coordinate system. Let B(x, y) denote the binary 2D object in Cartesian coordinates representing the recognized rectangular box area. There are three second-order moments as follows:
The rotation of the binary 2D object B(x, y) can now be calculated as follows:
The preceding formula-based on a method originally proposed by Teague (1980) -calculates the angle between the x-axis and the major axis of an ellipse that has equal second moments to the recognized rectangular box. It gives us the counterclockwise rotation of the object with respect to the horizon. After θ is calculated, the image can be rotated accordingly. It is worth noting that in the captured image, the borders of the rectangles are slightly curved rather than being straight due to lens artifact. This slight curvature does not affect our alignment algorithm. We use the raw bitmap image acquired from the camera instead of the processed JPEG image. This raw image is stored separately in the camera in the ".rw2" format and contains the raw information captured by the camera sensor without any processing.
After rotation is corrected, the image is delimited to the lowest and highest x and y values of the coordinates of the pixels inside the recognized rectangular box. This image is denoted by I (x, y). Meanwhile, the mask for the image is calculated as M (x, y). This mask is a binary vector with the same dimensions as I (x, y), with the value 0 indicating the corresponding pixel in I (x, y) to be masked out from the Hamming distance computation. In general, two categories of pixels are chosen to be masked out in our procedure. The first is the pixels with the intensity greater than the threshold computed by the Otsu method (Otsu 1975) and not considered as "scattered noise" in the border recognition phase. These include the printed rectangle, the filled square inside the box, and any artifacts (e.g., random pen scribbling). The second is the pixels outside the recognized box, including all edges in the picture. The last diagram in Figure 2 provides an illustration. These pixels are considered to contain unreliable information. They are identified as 0 in a binary mask 9:6 E. Toreini et al.
vector (similar to the identification of eyelids and eyelashes in iris recognition (Daugman 2003) ) and will be excluded in the subsequent Hamming distance comparison process.
Gabor Filter
Gabor filters are mainly used for edge detection in image processing. In addition, they have been found to perform efficiently in texture discrimination. Gabor filters are able to extract both coherent and incoherent characteristics of textural patterns (Daugman 1993) . Coherent properties are the patterns that remain unchanged between snapshots of the same sample, whereas incoherent ones refer to the patterns that change between snapshots of different samples. The 2D Gabor wavelets are popular in biometric recognition problems such as iris recognition (Daugman 2003) , fingerprint recognition (Lee and Wang 1999) , and face recognition (Liu and Wechsler 2002) . A Gabor filter's impulse response is basically that of a Gaussian filter modulated by a sinusoidal wave. Consequently, Gabor filters capture features in both the frequency and spatial domains. Generally speaking, a Gabor filter would consider the frequency of a pattern ("what") as well as the 2D position of the pattern ("where") (Daugman 1993) . Let exp be the natural exponential function. The 2D Gabor wavelet is calculated as follows using Cartesian coordinates:
where f is the frequency of the sinusoidal wave, η and γ are constant factors that together determine the spatial ellipticity of the Gabor wavelet, θ represents the orientation of the ellipticity, and σ is the standard deviation of the Gaussian envelope. Depending on the frequency of the sinusoidal wave and the orientation of their ellipticity, Gabor filters are capable of discriminating different textural characteristics. Usually, Gabor filters with a range of different frequencies, known as scales, and a range of different orientations are applied to find out the best combination of scale and orientation for a specific texture analysis problem. For a fixed maximum frequency f max and a maximum of U scales, each scale index u defines the frequency f used in Equation (2) as follows:
For a maximum of V orientations, we consider V angles equally distributed from 0 to π . Each orientation index v defines the orientation θ used in Equation (2) as follows:
We apply a Gabor filter to greyscale images. Let I (x, y) represent the greyscale image using Cartesian coordinates. The result of the application of a Gabor filter G (x, y) is simply the 2D convolution of I and G as follows:
The result C (x, y) is a complex number for each x and y. C (x, y) can be alternatively viewed as a matrix with the discrete values of x and y mapped to the columns and rows. Throughout the article, we use functions defined over Cartesian coordinates and matrices interchangeably. 
Fingerprint Generation
Our fingerprint generation method takes the output of a Gabor filter and produces a binary string. Let the element located in row j and column k of the matrix C (x, y) be m jk = a + bi. We define a 2-bit Gray code based on which quarter of the complex plane the element m jk = a + bi falls in (Figure 3 ). For example, when a and b are both positive, the encoded value will be 11. Thus, every element in the matrix is replaced by 2 bits. The result is a binary string that we refer to as the paper fingerprint.
Fractional Hamming Distance
After paper fingerprints are generated, fractional Hamming distance between any two fingerprints can be used to compare them. Hamming distance is simply the number of positions in which the bits disagree between two fingerprints. This is a classical bit error rate (BER) metric in communication. Fractional Hamming distance is the normalized version, resulting a value between 0 and 1. Usually, masking is used to discard the effect of irrelevant bits in a fingerprint. For each fingerprint, a mask is defined as a binary string of the same length in which bits corresponding irrelevant positions are set to 0 and bits corresponding effective positions are set to 1. The masks are calculated in the preparation phase as discussed earlier. Given two fingerprints f 1 and f 2 , and their corresponding masks m 1 and m 2 , the fractional Hamming distance is calculated as follows:
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR) operation and ∩ denotes the bitwise AND operation. A relatively small fractional Hamming distance indicates that the two fingerprints are likely to belong to the same paper sheet, whereas a relatively large fractional Hamming distance (around 0.5) indicates that the two fingerprints are likely to belong to different paper sheets. In the rest of the article, we simply use Hamming distance (for short) to refer to fractional Hamming distance.
EVALUATION
To evaluate our suggested method for paper fingerprinting, we collected several datasets in different situations. In this section, we first explain the parameter settings and experiment configurations under which we carried out our evaluations. Then we provide the details of the evaluation framework that we use to assess the results of our experiments. In particular, we consider metrics used for evaluating the effectiveness of biometric systems, as well as those used for evaluating the effectiveness of physical unclonable functions (PUFs), as paper fingerprints can be seen as both.
Subsequently, we give results that justify the choices we had to make in terms of how we collect our datasets and settings we use for the Gabor filter. Finally, we give the details of our main dataset collection and provide the results of our experiments, including evaluation of the proposed method against biometric and PUF metrics.
Parameter Settings and Experiment Configurations
To obtain consistent fingerprints, we require that a relatively small but fixed part of a sheet of paper is used as a source of fingerprint extraction. We chose to print a rectangular box (37 × 57 mm) on the sheet to indicate this area. In addition, we printed a small filled square (5 × 5 mm) at the bottom left of the box (see Figure 10 ). Using this small square, in our preparation phase our method can check that the rotation has been carried out correctly (distinguishing cases when the paper is placed upside down or flipped). The original photos in our experiments are all 3456 × 4608 pixels. After the preparation phase, we get a corrected and delimited image of variable size, ranging between around 2300 × 3300 pixels and 2350 × 3350 pixels. This image is then resized to a 640 × 640 pixel image I , which is then given as input to the Gabor filter. The rectangular size conversion is for the convenience of applying Gabor wavelets in the next stage to produce 2,048 bits in the output (the same size as an iris code). We use a Gabor impulse response of size 100 × 100, and the output of Gabor filter in our experiments, C, is a complex matrix of size 640 × 640. This matrix is downsampled to one of size 32 × 32 before being given as input to the fingerprint generation algorithm. This downsampling process is done by simply picking the elements in every 20th row and 20th column. Fingerprint generation replaces each complex value with 2 bits. Hence, the final paper fingerprint is a string of size 2 × 32 × 32 = 2,048 bits.
We chose to downsample the output of the Gabor filter for two reasons. First, it makes the data storage more compact. With 2,048 bits (256 bytes), we are able to store the fingerprint in a QR code as part of an authentication protocol (we will explain the protocol in more detail in Section 6). Second, adjacent pixels in the image are usually highly correlated. Hence, downsampling serves to break the correlation between bits. Through experiments, we found that this simple downsampling technique was effective to produce reliable and unique fingerprints.
All images were captured by a Panasonic DMC-FZ72 camera with a resolution of 16.1 megapixels. We chose this camera for two main reasons: the ability to capture a photo in macromode from a short distance (minimum 1cm focus) and the ability to mount a macroflash ring over the lens. However, these characteristics are not unique to this specific camera, and many other cameras available in the market provide the same characteristics. We mounted an off-the-shelf common macroflash ring on the camera lens to maintain a constant distance between the lens and the paper surface where the texture is photographed. The camera and its accessories are shown in Figure 4 (a). In our experiments, we do not use the flash of the macroflash ring; the light source is an ordinary office overhead projector as shown in Figure 4 (b). The light that the overhead projector provides is intense and adjustable. Furthermore, it has a flat surface with constant distance from the light source. This allows us to put the paper on the surface and then rest the macro ring on top of it before the camera takes a photo of the paper texture. The use of the macro ring also serves to shield the effects of other ambient light sources (e.g., daylight, office lighting). In Section 5.3, we explain the effect of the light source by using an alternative source: a commodity light box (tracing pad) as shown in Figure 4 (c).
Our evaluations were performed on a PC with an Intel Core i7-2600S CPU @ 2.80GHz with 8GB of memory. The operating system was 64-bit Windows 7 Enterprise, and we used Matlab R2015a (64 bit) to develop our algorithms. 
Evaluation Framework
Our work is closely related to the fields of biometrics and PUFs. Biometrics is the science of authenticating humans by measuring their unique characteristics and has a long history of research. A paper fingerprint works similar to biometrics, except it measures unique characteristics of a physical object instead of a human being. Hence, common metrics that measure the error rate performance of a biometric system apply to our work as well. However, paper fingerprints are related to the field of PUFs, which is relatively new, starting from the seminal work of Pappu et al. (2002) . Typically, PUFs require a challenge and response dynamic, but according to the definition by Maes (2012) , paper can be regarded a nonintrinsic PUF-that is, a PUF that does not contain the circuitry to produce the response on its own. Hence, the same evaluation methods in PUF are also applicable to paper fingerprints.
Because of the close relation to these two fields and their respective evaluation frameworks, we evaluate our method based on metrics used in both fields for a comprehensive analysis. We note that previous works either use biometric or PUF metrics; however, using both allows us to perform a meaningful comparison with related biometrics and PUF systems. It would be interesting to study the relationships between these metrics and define a unified framework that can be applied to evaluate both biometrics and PUF systems. We leave this to future work.
In the following, we give a brief description of these metrics. We discuss Hamming distance distributions, decidability, and recognition rates including the false rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR) in the former category of metrics. In the latter category, we consider uniformity and randomness in the space dimension, reliability and steadiness in the time dimension, and uniqueness and bit aliasing in the device dimension.
Biometric metrics. A biometric authentication problem is a specific case of statistical decision problem in which one decides if two given biometric measurements belong to the same source or not. To provide necessary information about the effectiveness of such a biometric, the parameters of the so-called biometric decision landscape need to be specified (Daugman 2000) . If Hamming distance is used for comparison, as it is in our case, the distributions of Hamming distance for two groups of comparisons need to be determined: for comparisons between paper fingerprints originating from the same paper sheet and for comparisons between paper fingerprints originating from different paper sheets. These are called same-group and different-group distributions, respectively.
For an effective biometric, the same-group and different-group distributions should be well separated. This makes the decision problem solvable. Let μ 1 and μ 2 denote the means, and σ 1 and σ 2 the standard deviations, of the two distributions. Daugman defines the decidability metric d as follows (Daugman 2004) :
where | · | denotes absolute value. Decidability as defined previously is indicative of how well separated the two distributions are: the further and the more concentrated the distributions are, the higher the decidability will be. To give an idea about typical values, the decidability of iris recognition, a well-established and effective biometric method, is d ≈ 14 in an ideal measurement environment and d ≈ 7 in a nonideal environment (Daugman 2004) . After determining the same-group and different-group distributions, one decides a threshold value situated between the two distributions. Subsequently, the decision on whether two reported biometrics belong to the same origin or not is then made by computing the Hamming distance between the two biometric samples and comparing it to the threshold. For an effective biometric, measurements from the same origin have relatively low Hamming distance and hence fall below the threshold, whereas measurements from different origins have relatively high Hamming distance and fall above the threshold. If the distributions are completely separated, the decision is correct all the time. However, in practice, usually there is some overlap between the two distributions. The FAR is the proportion of biometrics from different origins falsely accepted as being from the same origin. The FRR is the proportion of biometrics from the same origin falsely rejected as being from different origins. For an effective biometric, the FAR and FRR should be low-ideally zero.
A widely used measure of effectiveness of a biometric is degrees of freedom (DoF). DoF is a measure of the combinatorial complexity of the biometric test-in other words, the number of bits in a biometric measurement that are independent (Daugman 2004) . Consider a biometric that provides DoF N -that is, N independent and unpredictable bits. A comparison between two such biometrics from different origins can be modeled as the probability that a threshold number of N independently chosen bits agree. Hence, the different-group distribution for such a biometric would follow the binomial distribution with mean μ = p and variance σ 2 = Np(1 − p), where p is the probability of single bit agreement. Hence, the DoF for a biometric with a different-group distribution that follows a binomial distribution with mean μ and variance σ 2 can be calculated as follows:
PUF metrics. Paper fingerprinting can be seen as an optical PUF (Pappu et al. 2002) , as pointed out in the literature (Maes 2012 (Maes , 2013 . However, previous works on paper fingerprinting did not evaluate their results in this context. We believe that evaluating our results against established PUF metrics provides further information about the effectiveness of our method and helps put our results in perspective within PUF literature.
We follow the unified framework put forward by Maiti et al. (2013) . This framework provides metrics to evaluate a PUF in three dimensions: space, time, and device. In our case, PUFs are the paper fingerprints, and devices are the different paper sheets. Each of these dimensions quantifies a specific quality of a fingerprint: the space dimension analyzes the overall variations of fingerprints, the time dimension indicates same-group consistency, and the device dimension discusses the different-group diversity of fingerprints.
Before describing these dimensions, let us define the symbols we use in this framework. Here we consider effective fingerprints, denoted by r . The effective fingerprint is the result of applying the appropriate mask over the original fingerprint f . We use the following parameters: L is the number of bits in each fingerprint (2,048 in our setting). T refers to the number of samples taken from each paper sheet in a dataset (e.g., in our benchmark dataset, T = 10). N is the total number of paper sheets involved in a dataset (e.g., in our benchmark dataset, N = 100). We use the following indices accordingly: n denotes the paper sheet number within different sheets, t represents the sample number within the samples from the same paper sheet, and l shows the l-th bit in the effective fingerprint.
Space Dimension.
This dimension is concerned with bit variations with respect to the locations of the bits in fingerprints. Metrics in this dimension evaluate the overall intersheet behavior of fingerprints:
-Uniformity: This metric shows how uniform 0s and 1s are in a fingerprint. The ideal value for this metric is 0.5. Uniformity of the fingerprint from the t-th sample and n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
-Randomness: This metric indicates the average randomness of the bits in the fingerprints generated from several acquisitions from a sheet. The ideal value for this metric is 1. Randomness of the fingerprint bits generated from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
where
r n,t,l .
Time Dimension.
This dimension is concerned with fingerprint variations within multiple samples. Metrics in this dimension evaluate the overall intrasheet persistence of fingerprints within multiple samples:
-Reliability: This metric shows how consistently fingerprints are reproduced by the same sheet. The ideal value for this metric is 1. Reliability of the fingerprints generated from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
-Steadiness: This metric indicates the bias of individual fingerprint bits on average for a sheet. The ideal value for this metric is 1. Steadiness of the fingerprints generated from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Device Dimension.
This dimension is concerned with fingerprint variations between multiple sheets. Metrics in this dimension evaluate the overall intersheet distinguishability of fingerprints: -Uniqueness: This metric represents how distinguishable a sheet is within a group of sheets.
The ideal value for this metric is 0.5. Uniqueness of the fingerprints generated from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
-Bit-aliasing: This metric indicates how likely different sheets are to produce identical fingerprint bits. The ideal value for this metric is 0.5. Bit-aliasing of the l-th bit of the fingerprints generated from a dataset is calculated as follows:
Reflection Versus Transmission
As discussed earlier, the main motivation of our work is to capture paper textural patterns and efficiently extract unique paper fingerprints from such patterns using an off-the-shelf camera. By contract, previous works (Buchanan et al. 2005; Clarkson et al. 2009; Sharma et al. 2011 ) extract paper fingerprints from the paper surface. Our hypothesis is that textural patterns revealed by the transmissive light contain richer features than the paper surface shown by the reflective light.
To verify this hypothesis, we set up an experiment to investigate the difference between the two patterns. We set up the paper photographing in two settings: one with the light source on the same side of the paper and the other with the light source on the opposite side of the paper ( Figure 5 ). In the former, we put an opaque object behind the paper so that only the paper surface is photographed based on the reflective light. We selected 10 common A4 (210 × 297 mm) paper sheets with grammage of 80 g/m 2 . We took 10 photos of each sheet in each of the two settings. We used a common overhead projector as our light source. We tried to reduce the effect of any ambient light by setting our data collection environment in a dark room. This data collection resulted in two datasets: a 100-sample dataset (10 sheets with 10 samples for each sheet) for surface measurements and a 100-sample dataset (10 sheets with 10 samples for each sheet) for textural measurements.
After the data collection, we performed our fingerprint extraction algorithm (as discussed in Section 3) for both datasets. Figure 6 shows the Hamming distance distributions for the two cases. Each diagram depicts four distributions: for each case (i.e., surface and texture), there is one curve, concentrated around lower values of Hamming distance, showing the distribution of Hamming distance between pairs of fingerprints of the same paper sheet, and a second curve, concentrated around a Hamming distance value of about 0.5, showing the distribution of Hamming distance between pairs of fingerprints of different paper sheets.
Ideally, for effective fingerprint recognition, we want the "same-group" and "different-group" distributions to be as separate as possible, as then we can easily decide on a threshold and consider any two fingerprints with a Hamming distance below that threshold to belong to the same paper sheet, and consider any two fingerprints with a Hamming distance above that threshold to belong to different paper sheets.
As can be seen in Figure 6 , the two distributions (i.e., same group and different group) are well separated in the case of texture but less so in the case of surface. In fact, in the case of texture, the minimum Hamming distance for different comparisons is 0.46 and the maximum Hamming distance for similar comparisons is 0.27, which shows that there is no overlap between the two distributions. However, in the case of surface, the minimum Hamming distance for different comparisons is 0.44 and the maximum Hamming distance for similar comparisons is 0.48, which shows that there is some overlap between the two distributions, and hence false negative or false positive decisions are inevitable in this case. Indeed, decidability for the case of texture is around 20, but for the case of surface it is around 6. Furthermore, the number of DoF provided by the texture is slightly higher than that provided by the surface. These results support our hypothesis that the textural measurements through transmissive light contain more distinctive features than surface measurements based on reflective light and hence can be used as a more reliable source for paper fingerprinting.
We should stress that the hypothesis is tested using a specific image capturing condition in which only one snapshot is taken. One should not directly compare the results to the 3D method of Clarkson et al. (2009) , which is carried out in a different test condition and involves taking four scans from four different angles on the paper surface. However, we believe that a method based on taking a single snapshot is easier and quicker than one that requires multiple measurements.
Determining the Gabor Scaleand Orientation
As discussed, the Gabor filter can be configured with different scales and orientations. To find out the appropriate combination of scales and orientation for our method, we set up an initial experiment. We collected a dataset including two subdatasets: the first one includes 20 samples from one paper sheet, and the second one includes one sample from each of 20 paper sheets. These 9:14 E. Toreini et al.
two subdatasets constitute our same-group and different-group data, respectively. We applied a Gabor filter for eight orientations, indexed from 1 to 8, representing angles 0, . Considering f max = 0.25, we also considered multiple scales, indexed by integer values starting from scale 1. We used fixed values of η = γ = √ 2 and σ = 1. Ideally, we would want the different-group distribution to be centered around 0.5 or a mean very close to 0.5. Our experiments show that for scales greater than 7, the mean of the differentgroup distribution falls below 0.45, which indicates undesirable bias on the binomial distributions (i.e., tossing a coin is no longer random in a Bernoulli trial (Daugman 2003) ). Therefore, in the following, we limit the scope of our investigation to scales from 1 to 7.
Our calculations show that as the scale increases, the decidability of the distributions increases, but at the same time the number of the DoF the different-group distribution provides decreases. This is because the scale relates to the spatial frequency components of the Gabor filer-the smaller the scale, the more detailed the feature extraction. When the scale is 1, the finest detail of the paper texture is extracted, which leads to high DoF in the generated fingerprint. However, at this scale, the image processing is extremely sensitive to noise, which reduces the separation between the same-group and different-group histograms of Hamming distances. Increasing the scale results in a zooming-out effect. More correlations between bits are introduced, which reduces the DoF. However, the feature extraction is more tolerant of noise. As a result, the same-paper and different-paper characteristics become more distinctive, which leads to a higher decidability.
The results for decidability and DoF for orientations 1 through 8 and scales 1 through 7 are shown in Figure 7 (a) and (b), respectively. Both parts of the figure also include a spline interpolation of average values of different orientation results within each scale to highlight the dominant trends. Therefore, there is an evident trade-off in choosing the scale and orientation. Too low a scale would not provide an acceptable decidability, whereas too high a scale would not provide a reasonable DoF. Through experiments, we find that the combination of scale 5 and orientation 7 provides a good trade-off between decidability and DoF. As we explain later, this combination provides nearly perfect recognition rates. In the rest of the article, we report all of our findings based on this specific configuration of the Gabor filter.
The Benchmark Dataset
Our main dataset on which we report our evaluations is a set of 1,000 samples collected by taking 10 photos of each of 100 different paper sheets to provide a good diversity. We use typical office paper sheets of size A4 (210 × 297 mm) with grammage of 80 g/m 2 . All sheets were from the same pack and of the same brand. In all of the photos, camera settings, including aperture and exposure time, were kept constant. We tried to keep the paper sheets visually aligned for the different samples and conducted separate experiments to evaluate the robustness of our algorithm against rotations (which we discuss in Section 5). We refer to the main dataset collected here under relatively stable conditions as the benchmark dataset.
Experiment Results
In the following, we present the results of our experiments reporting the metrics introduced in Section 4.2. We also present the timing measurements for our method and provide a short discussion on its practicality. We provide comparison with existing work whenever the relevant metrics are reported in the literature.
Biometric metrics. We calculated the Hamming distance for all comparisons, consisting of same-group comparisons and different-group comparisons. There are a total of ( 1000 2 ) = 499,500 comparisons, of which 100 · ( different-group comparisons. In Figure 8 , we show the distributions for the same-group and different-group Hamming distance values. Clearly, the two distributions are well separated, which shows the effectiveness of our paper fingerprinting method. Indeed, the maximum same-group Hamming distance is 0.24, whereas the minimum different-group Hamming distance is 0.42, which shows that there is no overlap between the two distributions. Hence, any threshold between the preceding values would give us a FAR and FRR of zero. As an example, we can choose the threshold to be 0.4, but this is adjustable. Detailed error rate performance will be reported in Section 6.2. Decidability for the dataset is d ≈ 21, which compares favorably to d ≈ 14 for iris recognition in the ideal condition (Daugman 2003) . The number of DoF is calculated based on Equation (7) as N = 807, which means that the entropy of the extracted fingerprints is 807 bits out of a total of 2,048 bits. As compared to the 249 DoF for iris recognition (which has the same size of 2,048 bits), the fingerprint in our case is more unique and contains less redundancy. Figure 9 shows the histogram of same-group Hamming distance values on the left and the distribution of differentgroup Hamming distance values on the right. The diagram on the right also includes a binomial distribution curve with DoF N = 807, mean μ = 0.495, and standard deviation σ = 0.018. Evidently, the different-group distribution closely follows the binomial distribution. PUF evaluation results. The PUF metrics results on the benchmark dataset are shown in Table 2 under the Benchmark Dataset column. It can be seen that in all metrics, our dataset performed close to ideal values. For comparison, we also included in Table 2 the PUF metrics for two typical PUFs: Arbiter PUF and Ring Oscillator PUF (Maiti et al. 2013 ). This shows that our method provides fingerprints with good uniformity, randomness, reliability, steadiness, uniqueness, and bit-aliasing.
Timing results and usability. Our paper fingerprinting method takes 1.30 seconds on average to prepare the photo, analyze the texture, and generate the fingerprint on a PC. This is reasonably fast. This is in contrast with the method in Clarkson et al. (2009) , which requires four scans in different directions and then constructing a 3D surface model. Although Clarkson et al. (2009) do not report timing measurements for their fingerprinting method, 3D modeling is generally considered a computationally expensive task (Brown et al. 2008) .
The whole process of paper fingerprinting in our method is automatized and only requires a user to place the sheet of paper on the flat surface of the overhead projector and click a button to take a photo by a fixed camera. We note that this is only a proof-of-concept prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of extracting the fingerprint based on the textural patterns. One may improve the prototype in a practical application by tighter integration of various equipment components. For example, at a border control location, when the official swipes a page in a passenger's passport through a slot, the slot may have the embedded light source on one side and a camera on the other side. When the page is in the slot, a unique fingerprint can be extracted. The fingerprinting area and orientation will be relatively fixed, as it is determined by the dimensions of the slot. By comparing the extracted fingerprint with a reference sample (e.g., stored in the back-end system), the computer program can quickly determine if the passport page is genuine. In Section 6, we explain more on how to utilize the unique paper fingerprint in authentication protocols.
ROBUSTNESS EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate our method's robustness in nonideal circumstances. First, we consider the robustness of our method against misalignment, such as in cases where the rectangular box is not aligned to the photo frame. Then we consider the robustness of our method against paper being roughly handled in each of the following cases: the paper sheet is crumpled, some scribbling is done in the rectangular box, the sheet is soaked in water and dried afterward, and the sheet is ironed after soaking and partially burned. Finally, we consider the effect of using an alternative light source. In the following, we give the details of each experiment and provide the biometric and PUF metrics in each of the cases.
Impact of Nonideal Data Collection
Photo rotation. The orientation of the photo is the angle between the rectangular box and the photo frame. A rotated photo is shown in Figure 10 (b). The maximum rotation that we can have such that the box is still fully captured within the boundary of the photo frame is around 12 • . We selected 10 paper sheets and collected 5 samples in each angle within {−12 • , −11 • , . . . , 0 • , . . . , , +11 • , +12 • }. This gave us 125 samples per sheet and 1,250 samples in total. Figure 11 shows the Hamming distance distributions. As expected, the same-group and differentgroup distributions get slightly closer to each other in comparison with the benchmark dataset. However, decidability, although reduced, is still a healthy d ≈ 8. This shows that our image processing method is somewhat sensitive to the image rotation. We believe that there is still room to improve the robustness against rotation; however, with the current method and based on a threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0% and the FRR is less than 1%. These values can be found in Table 1 .
The PUF metrics are presented in Table 2 . The experiment dataset still has good uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing, but there is a slight drop in reliability, steadiness, and uniqueness compared to the benchmark dataset.
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Impact of Nonideal Paper Handling
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our method against rough handling of paper sheets, including crumpling, scribbling, soaking, and heating. For each of the experiments in this section, a set of 10 paper sheets was selected. For each paper sheet, 5 samples were taken before and 5 samples after the nonideal handling of the paper sheet, adding up to a total of 100 samples per experiment. The same-group and different-group distributions under the test conditions of crumpling, scribbling, soaking, and heating are shown in Figure 11 . For readability, we opt to show fitted curves for the distributions. These curves are nonparametric fits with a threshold bandwidth of 0.02 (i.e., the distributions are merely smoothed).
Crumpling. In this experiment, we crumpled our paper sheets to the extent that the borders of the rectangular box were visibly distorted. We did not try to smooth out the sheet surface after crumpling. An example of a photo taken from a crumpled paper sheet can be seen in Figure 10(c) .
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in Figure 11 . Decidability is d ≈ 4.6. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0% and the FRR is 3.2%. These values can be found in Table 1 .
The PUF metrics are presented in Table 3 . The experiment dataset still has good uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing, but there is a slight drop in reliability and uniqueness and a bigger drop in steadiness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Scribbling. In this experiment, we drew random patterns with a black pen over all samples such that each pattern covers around 5% of the box area. An example of such scribbling can be seen in Figure 10 (d). Our preprocessing phase successfully identifies the scribbled area in the mask in all samples.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in Figure 11 . The maximum samegroup Hamming distance is 0.25, and the minimum different-group Hamming distance is 0.45. The distributions are well separated. Decidability is d ≈ 9.7. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0% and the FRR is also 0%. These values can be found in Table 1 .
The PUF metrics are presented in Table 3 . The experiment dataset still has good uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing, but there is a slight drop in reliability, steadiness, and uniqueness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Soaking. In this experiment, we submerged the paper sheets in tap water for around 20 seconds. Then we let them dry naturally and collected the after-soaking samples from the dried sheets.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in Figure 11 . The maximum samegroup Hamming distance is 0.36, and the minimum different-group Hamming distance is 0.44. The distributions are well separated. Decidability is d ≈ 6.8. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0% and the FRR is also 0%. These values can be found in Table 1 .
Heating. In this experiment, we ironed all papers from the soaking experiment for at least 20 seconds, to the extent that in some cases there was a clearly visible color change (to light brown) and the paper was partly burned.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in Figure 11 . The maximum samegroup Hamming distance is 0.30, and the minimum different-group Hamming distance is 0.44. The distributions are well separated. Decidability is d ≈ 8.6. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0% and the FRR is also 0%. These values can be found in Table 1 .
Summary. Taking all of the preceding results into consideration, we can see that our method shows the strongest robustness against scribbling. Both the biometric and PUF measures support this observation. The Hamming distance distributions are well separated, and all PUF metrics remain close to ideal values. Fingerprinting is also fairly robust against rotation, soaking, and heating. There is no or negligible FRR, and all PUF metrics, possibly except for steadiness, remain close to ideal values. Crumpling seems to pose the strongest challenge to robustness. Although the FRR is 3.2% and steadiness is not ideal, the method is still able to provide 0% FAR and healthy PUF metrics otherwise.
Focusing on biometric metrics, authentication rates remain perfect or nearly perfect under all robustness tests. This means that our method provides a promising candidate for paper-based document authentication in practice that is able to cope with nonideal sample collection and rough handling.
Focusing on PUF metrics, space and device dimension metrics stay close to ideal values under all tests, which indicates that the quality of fingerprint bits are still good and the sheets remain clearly distinguishable from one another. Time dimension metrics remain close to ideal values for rotation and scribbling, but steadiness and, in some cases, reliability drops as a result of crumpling, soaking, or heating. This is expected, as crumpling, soaking, and heating physically change the paper sheets. 
Impact of a Different Light Source
The light source should be bright enough to reveal the texture patterns in a paper sheet. In the proof-of-concept experiments, we used an overhead projector; however, the equipment is relatively bulky and expensive. Questions remain if there are cheaper ways to obtain the light source and if the results are robust against using a different light source. To investigate this, we purchased a commodity light box (tracing pad) from Amazon for £49.99 (see Figure 4(c) ). Then we used the same paper sheets as in the benchmark dataset-excluding 10 paper sheets that were used in other robustness tests-to collect a new set of samples using the new light source. We followed the same data collection procedure as before.
Due to the difference in the light intensity, the camera setting needed to be adjusted. In particular, we altered the exposure time to 1/500 seconds and the F-stop to f/5. These values were automatically recommended by the camera, so we simply accepted them. The exposure time is the duration that the shutter takes to capture a photo and the F-stop is the radius of the lens diaphragm; both of them are inspired by the way human eyes react to a light source. These modifications in the camera setting were necessary because of the change in the intensity of the light source. The final dataset included 900 captured images, with 10 samples from each paper sheet.
Figure 12(a) shows the Hamming distance distributions using the light box. The same-group and different-group distributions are well separated from each other. Applying the biometric metrics, our analysis shows the decidability d ≈ 24 and the number of the DoF N ≈ 846, both slightly higher than those obtained with the overhead projector. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR and FRR are still 0%. These values can be found in Table 1 .
The PUF metrics are presented in Table 3 . The new experiment results show that all PUF metrics are comparable to those obtained earlier in the benchmark dataset. Figure 12 (b) shows the Hamming distance distribution by combining the light box and overhead projector datasets. The number of the DoF is roughly unchanged at N ≈ 836. However, the samegroup data become noisier because of mixing two different light sources. The decidability drops to 10. Despite the mix of different light sources, the same-group and different-group histograms are still clearly separated. The maximum Hamming distance for the same-group samples is 0.31, whereas the minimum Hamming distance of the different-group is 0.42.
The experiment shows that our method is robust against different light sources as long as the camera settings are set correctly.
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we explain authentication protocols based on the extracted paper fingerprint and discuss their practical performance.
Trust Assumptions
Our fingerprinting technique may be applied in a range of applications, such as to prevent counterfeiting of paper currency, passports, certificates, contracts and official receipts. The secure use of the fingerprint is based on two assumptions. Both assumptions are generally required in biometrics and PUF applications.
The first assumption is physical "unclonability." We assume that it is infeasible to physically clone a paper sheet with the same paper texture. The paper texture is formed from randomly interleaved wooden particles, as a naturally occurring outcome of the paper manufacturing process. This process cannot be precisely controlled. Repeating exactly the same process to produce the same paper texture is considered to be prohibitively expensive, if not impossible (Pappu 2001) .
The second assumption is about a trustworthy measuring process. Take the human fingerprint authentication as an example. If an attacker is able to deceive the scanner by presenting a gummy finger, the security guarantee based on the unclonability assumption will be lost. In any biometric or PUF application, it is important to ensure that the measurement is performed on a real object and a fresh measurement is acquired. In practice, this is often realized through human supervision in the process or by using specialized equipment (e.g., iris scanners with an embedded liveness test). In the case of paper documents, visual inspection can be applied to check that they are made of paper and the paper fiber texture has not been tampered with. An attacker may try to interfere with the texture measurement by printing patterns on the paper surface. Using today's commodity printers, it seems unlikely that an attacker is able to print patterns that are precise at the pixel level under the microscopic view of a high-resolution camera (since the print head cannot be precisely controlled and each printed dot tends to be in a scattered pattern due to imperfection of the printing process; see Clarkson et al. (2009) ). However, when the measurement is not guaranteed to be coming from real paper texture, the acquisition process is no longer trustworthy-an attacker can at least deny the authentication by printing random patterns with strong contrast on the paper. This threat can be addressed by checking that the intended area for authentication is free from overprinting.
Comparison Based on Hamming Distance
A straightforward application of authenticating a paper fingerprint is based on comparing the Hamming distance between two fingerprints. It consists of two phases. In the first phase, a paper fingerprint, along with a mask, is extracted from the textural patterns as the template and stored in a database. In the second phase, given a provided paper sheet, the same fingerprinting algorithm is followed to output a new fingerprint and a mask. Depending on the applications, there are two types of authentication modes: verification and recognition.
Verification works on a one-to-one comparison. This assumes that the reference to the stored template is known (as it is often provided by the authenticating subject). Hence, once the template is retrieved, it is a straightforward comparison between two fingerprints based on their Hamming distance as explained in Equation (5). This comparison determines if the presented paper sheet is the same as the one registered earlier.
By contrast, recognition works on a one-to-many comparison. In this case, the reference to the prestored template is unknown. Hence, the program searches throughout the database, comparing the extracted fingerprint exhaustively with each of the stored templates to identify a match where the Hamming distance is sufficiently small. This is the same as how iris recognition works. In terms of accuracy, the recognition mode is far more demanding than the verification mode because the FAR accumulates with the size of the database. As an illustration, let P 1 be the FAR for one-to-one matching in the verification mode. Assume that P 1 is very small. Let P n be the FAR in the recognition mode for a database of n records.
The preceding equation shows that the accumulative FAR in the one-to-many mode increases roughly linearly with the size of the database (Daugman 2003) . Hence, for the one-to-many matching to work accurately, the FAR for the one-to-one comparison must be extremely small.
For the paper fingerprints extracted in our proposal, they have sufficient entropy to support precise recognition even for an extremely large database. Based on the binomial distributions with 807 DoF, the FARs for comparing two paper fingerprints are listed in Table 4 . If we opt to maintain P n < 10 −6 for the recognition mode as stated in Daugman (2003) , our algorithm can easily support searching a database of 3 quintillion (3 × 10 18 ) fingerprints at a threshold of 0.32. By comparison, for the same accuracy (<10 −6 ) and the same threshold (0.32), iris recognition can only support a database of 26 iris codes. (As stated in Daugman (2003) , for a database of 1 million iris codes, the threshold needs to be adjusted downward to below 0.27 to keep the FAR under 10 −6 ). Because of the much higher DoF of paper fingerprints, they can be used for the recognition application at a much larger scale than the iris biometric.
Paper Fingerprint Encryption
One limitation with the previous verification/recognition method is that the template is stored in plaintext in the database. When the plaintext template is revealed, it may cause degradation of security. This is especially the case with biometrics, as biometric data is considered private to each individual. Paper fingerprints are essentially "biometrics" of paper. One established technique in biometrics is through biometric encryption. Similarly, we can apply the similar technique to realize fingerprint encryption. We will present one concrete construction and show that since paper fingerprints have much higher entropy than even the most accurate biometric in use (iris), the corresponding encryption scheme is able to provide much higher security assurance as well. Fig. 13 . Generated QR code in the authentication protocol. This QR code contains the encrypted fingerprint, H (k ), and a digital signature for both items.
Our construction is based on the scheme of Hao et al. (2006) . This work is inspired by Juels and Wattenberg (1999) and has been successfully implemented in iris recognition. It comprises two phases. In the first phase, the program extracts a paper fingerprint from the paper texture as a reference f a . It then generates a random key k (140 bits) and expands the key to a pseudofingerprint f p = ErrorCC(k ) (a 2,048-bit codeword), where ErrorCC is an error-correction encoding scheme based on Hadamard-Reed-Solomon. Our analysis shows there is a combination of block and random errors in our fingerprints; therefore, we selected a concatenated approach. The choice of 140 bits k is a balance between security (minimum 128-bit security for the secret key) and performance, as well as considering the special parametric requirements for a concatenated code scheme to work at a desired level of error correction. Subsequently, the scheme computes an encrypted fingerprint r = f a ⊕ f p . In addition, the program computes h = H (k ), where H is a secure one-way hash function. Finally, the program stores r and h in the database. Alternatively, r and h can be stored in a 2D barcode printed on paper. The advantage of doing so is to allow authentication in the offline mode. In this case, an additional digital signature s should be included to prove the authenticity of data in the barcode. At this stage, the original template f a and the random key k can be safely deleted. The registration process is summarized in Algorithm 1. In Figure 13 , we show a QR code generated from the registration phase in our prototype implementation.
The second phase is authentication. In this phase, data from the 2D barcode is first read and the digital signature verified. A paper fingerprint f s is extracted from the provided paper sheet. The program then computes the following:
In the preceding equation, e can be regarded as "noise" added to the codeword ErrorCC(k ). As we explained earlier, the Hamming distances between same-paper fingerprints typically range from 0 to 0.25. In the definition of the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon code, we follow the same coding parameters as in Hao et al. (2006) . The resultant error correction code is capable of correcting up to 27% error bits in a 2,048-bit codeword. Hence, by running the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon decoding The key feature of the preceding "fingerprint encryption" scheme is that it preserves the secrecy of the fingerprint template since it forms the basis for authentication. In this way, no fingerprint template is stored in the plain form. As an example for comparison, without using this encryption scheme, the barcode would contain the plain fingerprint template. Once in the line of sight to an attacker, the barcode can be trivially read, say, by using a video camera, and hence the template will be stolen. With the encryption scheme applied, the attacker would need physical access to the paper to take a close-up snapshot of the fiber textures with a bright light source shining underneath the paper. This makes the attack significantly more difficult to carry out in practice without the user noticing it.
Hence, the application of privacy-preserving protocol for authentication avoids storing the texture structure in the plain text form. The goal here is to protect the paper texture from an attacker who does not have physical access to the paper sheet itself. An adversary who has access to the barcode printed on the paper can read all data including an encrypted fingerprint r = f a ⊕ ErrorCC(k ). One potential problem as highlighted in Hao et al. (2006) is that if the fingerprint f a contains significant correlations between bits, r may leak information about the fingerprint. Hao et al. (2006) use the iris code as an example to illustrate that due to a high level of redundancy in iris codes, the encrypted iris code only has a lower-bound security of 44 bits. However, 44-bit security is not sufficient to satisfy high security requirements. As a result, the encrypted iris code (also called the secure sketch in the PUF literature) should not be published as public data; instead, it should be stored in a personal token as suggested in Hao et al. (2006) .
The preceding limitation with the iris codes does not apply in our case. Although the paper fingerprint defined in our work has the same size as an iris code (2,048 bits), it has much higher DoF (807 as compared to 249). Following the same sphere-packing bound as defined in Hao et al. (2006) , we estimate the lower-bound security for the encrypted fingerprints as follows. Here the lowerbound security refers to the minimum efforts required for a successful brute-force attack, under the assumption that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the correlations within the document paper sheet's fingerprint, and hence the uncertainty (or entropy) about the fingerprint is 807 bits instead 2,048 bits. The error correction capability for the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon code allows correcting up to 27% error bits. Thus, in principle, the attacker only needs to guess a fingerprint that is within the Hamming distance of 807 × 0.27 ≈ 218 bits to the correct fingerprint. Following the estimation method in Hao et al. (2006) , based on the sphere-packing bound (Hamming 1950) , the minimum guess effort with z = 807 and w = 218 is calculated with the following equation:
The above bound states that an attacker with full knowledge about fingerprint correlations and the error correction process would need at least 2 133 attempts to uncover the original fingerprint used in the registration and the random key k. This 133-bit security is much higher than the 44-bit security reported in Hao et al. (2006) and is sufficient for almost all practical applications. This is possible because the paper textural patterns are far more distinctive than iris textural patterns. In iris patterns, there exist substantial correlations along the radial structures (Daugman 2003) . The same phenomenon does not exist in paper texture, which explains the higher DoF in our case. This high level of security makes it possible to simply store the (r , h, s) values on a barcode instead of in a secure database. Alternatively, they may be stored in an RFID chip and retrieved wirelessly during the verification phase (e.g., in an e-passport application).
We evaluate the performance of this authentication scheme based on the benchmark database and are able to report perfect error rates: 0% FRR and 0% FAR. Note that this performance evaluation is slightly different from the direct comparison between two fingerprints based on their Hamming distance. The authentication is successful only if the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon code is able to correct the errors (introduced by the XOR between two fingerprints) added to the error correction codeword and hence recover the same random k (verified again H (k )). The authentication protocol can only accommodate raw fingerprints without masks (see Hao et al. (2006) ). Figure 14 shows the histogram of Hamming distance between raw fingerprints without masks. The same-paper and different-paper distributions are well separated. The error correct code that we implemented corrects errors up to 27%. This is sufficient to correct errors for all same-paper fingerprints but not sufficient for different-paper fingerprints. This explains the 0% FRR and 0% FAR that we obtain (see Figure 14) .
RELATED WORK
In Section 1, we highlight three prominent works in the field-Buchanan et al. (2005), Clarkson et al. (2009), and Sharma et al. (2011) -that inspired our work. In this section, we conduct a more comprehensive review of the related work. Special paper. Some researchers proposed to fingerprint paper by embedding special materials. Bauder (1983) was the first to propose the idea of a certificate of authenticity (COA), which is a collection of fibers randomly positioned in an object and permanently fixed by using transparent gluing material. Once an end-point of a fiber is exposed to light, the other end is illuminated, and as a whole this creates unique illuminated patterns, which can be captured by a light detector. The main intended application is to use COA for banknotes to ensure authenticity. Kirovski (2004) followed up on the work of Bauder (1983) and proposed to combine the captured illuminated patterns with arbitrary text, signed with the private key of the banknote issuer. The signature is then encoded as a barcode and printed on the banknote. Chen et al. (2005) proposed an improved scanner to achieve automated verification of fiber-based COAs. In a similar work, Bulens et al. (2010) proposed to embed different material-ultraviolet fibers-into the paper mixture and use an ultraviolet scanner to obtain a unique fingerprint. The authors report that the derived fingerprints have 72-bit entropy.
Unmodified paper and using laser. One limitation with all of the works mentioned previously is that they require modifying the paper manufacturing process. Other researchers investigated fingerprinting techniques that can work with ordinary paper without altering the manufacturing process at all. One prominent work along this line of research is due to Buchanan et al. (2005) . The researchers proposed to use a focused laser beam to scan across a sheet of standard white paper and continuously record the reflected intensity from four different angles by using four photodetectors. The laser reflection is random and is determined by the nonuniform paper surface. Hence, the recorded reflection intensities constitute a unique fingerprint. Van Beijnum et al. (2006) followed up on this research idea by formulating a criterion for recognition that limits the FAR to 0.1%. Samsul et al. (2010) presented a similar idea of shooting a beam of laser onto the surface of the paper. But instead of using photodetectors, they proposed to use a CCD camera to capture the microscopic patterns of speckles.
Unmodified paper and using light. Laser-based fingerprinting methods have the limitation that they require special laser equipment. A more cost-effective solution is to use a commonly available light source. Métois et al. (2002) proposed custom-built equipment called the imager, which consists of a consumer-grade video module and lens housed along with an embedded lighting apparatus. The imager provides a greyscale snapshot of the naturally occurring inhomogeneities of the paper surface. The snapshot is then processed into a vector of real numbers. The authentication of paper fingerprints is based on computing the correlation coefficient between vectors. The equal error rate is reported to be about 9%. Clarkson et al. (2009) proposed a similar method to fingerprint a paper document by using a commodity scanner instead of a specially built imager. Their work was motivated by the observation that when viewed up close, the surface of a sheet of paper is a tangled mat of wood fibers with a rich 3D texture that is random and hard to reproduce. Utilizing the embedded light emission, the researchers use a commodity scanner to scan a paper sheet in four different orientations. Then a 3D model is constructed based on these four scans. Furthermore, the 3D model is compressed into a feature vector through computing Voronoi distributions in the scanned region. The comparison between two feature vectors is based on computing the correlation coefficient. Pham et al. (2011) adopted the same approach as Clarkson et al. (2009) by using an Epson 10000XL scanner at 600dpi to collect 10 scans of the paper surface. In particular, they look at the case when text has been printed over the authentication zone and propose two methods of pixel inpainting to remove printed text (or marks) from the authentication zone to allow ordinary correlation to be performed. Different from the proposed method of Clarkson et al. (2009) that compresses the scanned images into a compact feature vector and compares feature vectors based on the correlation coefficient, Pham et al. (2011) proposed to use alpha-masked imaging matching to compare regions of the two paper surface images. Improvements are demonstrated using the collected datasets in their experiments. Sharma et al. (2011) proposed a different surface-based fingerprinting method. Unlike prior paper fingerprinting techniques (Clarkson et al. 2009; Pham et al. 2011 ) that extract fingerprints based on the fiber structure of paper, their method uses a USB microscope to capture the surface speckle pattern, a random bright and dark region formation at the microscopic level when light falls on the paper surface. The captured patterns are then processed into a vector of digits, which form the unique fingerprint. Fingerprints are compared based on the Euclidean distance between the two vectors. Beekhof et al. (2008) proposed a fingerprinting method based on measuring random microstructures of the paper surface. The random microstructural patterns are captured by using a mobile phone camera with a macrolens mounted. The captured image is compressed into a binary feature vector by first hashing the image values into a list of codewords and then running the decoding process through a reference list decoding technique. Two feature vectors are compared based on the Hamming distance. Smith and Sutherland (1999) proposed another method to capture light reflections from the paper surface. Their method involves printing an 8mm box on paper and then taking a snapshot of it. The alignment can then be done automatically by software based on the printed box, but no details are given in their work. The authors apply a "texture hash function" to generate the fingerprints. Fingerprints are authenticated based on computing correlations of the texture hash strings. Haist and Tiziani (1998) proposed a method to fingerprint German banknotes by using a CCD digital camera to take a snapshot of a banknote based on transmissive light. Then the snapshot is saved as a JPEG image (2.86KB), which, along with a digital signature, is printed on the banknote as a string of 3,250 ASCII characters on an area of 5cm 2 . However, no prototype implementation is reported. The verification is performed by applying the Fourier transform to obtain a feature vector and computing the correlation between the two vectors. Their idea is the closest to ours in terms of using transmissive light. However, our work is substantially different from theirs in several important aspects. First, their work involves testing only three German Deutsche Mark banknotes, whereas the test datasets used in our work are far more extensive. Second, they do not perform image preprocessing. As a result, the positioning and orientation are done manually rather than automatically by a software algorithm as in our case. Third, they do not carry out image encoding. Consequently, they need to store a JPEG image (2.86KB), whereas we only need to store a compact fingerprint (256 bytes). Fourth, they do not implement their idea in a prototype system. Hence, the feasibility remains uncertain. Most importantly, the work of Haist and Tiziani (1998) does not report any error rate performance, or any entropy analysis, and it does not perform extensive robustness tests as we have done.
Van Renesse (1995) proposed a 3D-structure authentication system (3DAS) to authenticate a standard PVC ID card that has a 3 × 3 mm 2 3DAS structure in a transparent window. The 3DAS structure contains spunlaid fibers that are thermally bonded at their cross points. In their experiment setup, two infrared emitting diodes (IREDs) are used as lighting sources to shine on the 3DAS area from two different angles. This creates two shadow images that are then captured by a 2D CCD array. By alternatively switching both IREDs, the required parallel images are produced. Finally, a 20-byte fingerprint is obtained by calculating the centers of gravity of the captured images. However, the work of van Renesse (1995) does not report error rate performance or perform any entropy analysis. It does not report robustness tests either.
Summary. We have presented related paper fingerprinting techniques proposed in the literature, which have different requirements on paper material, use different types of illuminating sources and scanning equipment, apply different signal processing techniques, and obtain fingerprints of different types and features. Our work advances the state of the art in this field by presenting the first practical solution that works with ordinary paper, uses an ordinary lighting source combined with an off-the-shelf camera, takes only 1.3 seconds to produce a compact fingerprint (256 bytes) from one snapshot, achieves an ideal 0% FFR and 0% FAR as well as very high entropy (807 bits) in fingerprints, and is demonstrably robust against rotation, crumpling, scribbling, soaking, and heating. The near-perfect result is attributed to the idea of capturing the paper textural patterns through transmissive light. As detailed in Section 4.2, using transmissive light reveals richer textural patterns than reflective light and produces more reliable features. This explains our superior result as compared to the earlier surface-based paper fingerprinting methods (Buchanan et al. 2005; Clarkson et al. 2009; Sharma et al. 2011 ).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this research, we propose to fingerprint a paper sheet based on its texture patterns instead of features on the surface as done by previous work. We show that the former contain more distinctive features than the latter with higher decidability in the histogram of Hamming distance distributions. The experiments are set up to use a commodity camera to photograph the texture patterns with a light source shining on the other side of the paper. The rich texture patterns are processed using Gabor wavelets to generate a compact 2,048-bit fingerprint code. Based on the collected database, we report zero error rates, and the method is shown to work well with different light sources and is resistant against various distortions such as crumpling, scribbling, soaking, and heating. The extracted fingerprints contain 807 DoF, which is sufficiently high for many practical applications. As an example, some applications (like e-passport) rely on a tamper-resistant RFID chip embedded in the paper document for proving the authenticity of the document (through a challenge-response protocol based on a long-term secret stored in the chip). Our method provides an alternative solution that leverages the natural physical properties of the paper document instead of the tamper resistance of an extra embedded chip.
In this article, we have focused the testing of our method on office paper sheets. In the future, we plan to extend our study to other types of paper, such as thermal paper, labels, and passport pages, as long as the light can transmit through. However, based on the thickness of the paper and the difference in the texture materials, we believe it is likely that some changes in the intensity of the light, camera settings, Gabor filter scale, and orientation will need to be made. These questions will be addressed in our future work.
